From Judaism to Jewishness: How Does the Problem of Sexuality Run Through Antisemitism?

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Abstract: This paper investigates how the problem of sexuality runs through antisemitism by bringing Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault in a conceptual dialogue. It first analyzes the problem of sexuality in Foucauldian terms from the antiquity to the Middle Ages. Then, it analyzes how the problem of sexuality gave rise to an immense apparatus of examination and control, which served an analytic grid for all problematized figures in terms of inner nature in the entire modern period. And finally, it draws a conceptual link between Foucauldian theory and Arendt's account on the social history of antisemitism in order to identify the problem of sexuality at every level of its discursive formation.

Introduction

> "In its Bible the Catholic Church continues to impart to all Catholics that Jews are the children of hell's master […] Its foundational text is the source of, and consecrating authority for, the most damaging antisemitism" (Goldhagen, 2007, p. 207).

As it can be seen from the above-mentioned statement of the controversial historian Daniel Goldhagen that, defining antisemitism as a mere continuity -or a secularized version- of early-Christian morality continues to occupy social-historical debates around antisemitism. Yet, many scholars since the late-twentieth century define antisemitism as a strictly modern phenomenon of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That it cannot be imagined without the immense apparatuses of surveillance, examination and discourse developed under the nation-state, primarily through penal, medical and psychiatric institutions. This can be regarded as a shared view in both the analyses of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt. Arendt, for instance, stresses in *Origins of Totalitarianism* that, defining antisemitism as a mere 'secularized version of popular medieval superstitions' is problematic and oversimplified. She adds, in terms of Jewish-Gentile relations, 'Jew-hatred', and their persecution 'under the conditions of Jewish dispersion', had existed when Roman Empire was still dominated by paganism. Nonetheless, the 'hiatus' between the late-Middle Ages and early-modern era, according to Arendt, marked a period in which the Jews "began to think that the difference between Jewry and the nations was fundamentally not of creed and faith, but one of inner nature" (Arendt, 1973, pp. xi-xiii). Evidently, one could argue that Arendt identifies a new form of subjectivity beginning to shape in this period, which did not exist under the previous conditions that determined Jewish-Gentile relations.

Moreover, although Foucault does not exclusively deal with antisemitism in his works, he briefly touches upon the problem in *Society Must Be Defended,* that it shall be considered within the broader question of racism, which only transformed into a strictly biological problem in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, Foucault emphasizes that all forms of racism developed in the West, including antisemitism, could be linked with a form of critical, historical and political analysis emerged between sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Foucault, 2003, pp. 87-88). By the sixteenth century during the Reformation, concepts borrowed from the Church regarding 'prophecy' and 'promise' about revealing the hidden truth about something evil, and dividing phenomena into binary oppositions began to shape the discourses of religious, moral and political protests. This was followed by the development of a 'biblical-style historical discourse', which constantly articulated a strict division of the social body into binary oppositions in terms of 'us' and 'them' (pp. 70-74). The concept of 'race-struggle' was coined through these historical discourses, which did not initially reflect a 'stable' biological meaning, but rather a particular

'historico-political' divide. The opposing sides were only linked together in a form of constant struggle regardless of their continuous coexistence. What divided them were merely "barriers created by privileges, customs and rights, the distribution of wealth, or the way in which power was exercised" (p. 77).

Although he only implicitly mentions here as 'biblical-style historical discourse', in his earlier lecture series *Abnormal,* he articulates in more detail that how this form of analysis had emerged from confession and spiritual direction under the Catholic Church. Simply, Foucault argues that an immense apparatus of examination and control developed around the problem of sexuality, which served as an analytic grid for institutions varying from penal system and ethnology to medicine, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Moreover, Foucault emphasizes that these institutions also borrowed the problematization of inner nature as a derivative of the problem of sexuality. Through the problem of inner nature, according to Foucault, the problem of sexuality runs through every problematization of inner being throughout the modern period, from juridico-political monsters to abnormality. In the light of this Foucauldian conviction, this paper aims to explore how the problem of sexuality runs through antisemitism, from the problematization of 'poor Jewish masses' to 'Jewishness as an abnormality acquired by birth'. To find adequate answers to the latter question, it aims to construct a parallel between Arendt's account on antisemitism and Foucault's account on abnormal and the problem of sexuality. Through this link it will be argued that antisemitism, as a modern phenomenon, is an outcome of constant reformulations and borrowing of concepts from preceding discourses, which cannot be regarded as mere continuity -or discontinuity- of early-Christian morality. As a somewhat underemphasized field of research, such scholars as Amy Allen identify a rising academic interest in combining Arendt's and Foucault's views; yet, she indicates that "their work has not been brought into a serious and sustained dialogue" (Allen, 2002, p. 131).

Problematization of Sexuality: From Antiquity to Middle Ages

From a Foucauldian perspective, the problematization of sexuality through judicial, pedagogical and medical institutions in the nineteenth century cannot be simply defined as a strict continuity of early-Christian sexual morality. Such a direct correlation would, first, require a clear separation between the sexual morality of Christianity and of the classical antiquity developed within -or alongside- Greco-Roman paganism. Nonetheless, in *The Use of Pleasure* Foucault argues that such distinctions would be extremely difficult as he strongly emphasizes that there are "direct borrowing and strict continuities between the first Christian doctrines and the moral philosophy of antiquity" (Foucault, 1992, p. 15). In the first Christian treatises on morality of sexual conduct one could identify an implicit link between sexual conduct and evil, through which they advocated self-restraint, procreative monogamy and condemning same sex relations. Such themes were, to a certain extent, already present within circles of Stoic and Platonic thought. In Plato's *Phaedrus,* for instance, Socrates explicitly dismisses the sexual conducts between an adult man and an adolescent boy. According to Foucault, although these portrayals were still too ancient and did not denounce same sex relations in its totality, they gave rise to its problematization under certain circumstances. Thus, the principles of morality placed within these elaborations exclusively concerned with free adult men, a group of individuals distinguished from broader society, with the goal of self-mastery (pp. 18-21).

Through these elaborations, masculine conduct of behavior became a material for stylization, whilst sexual austerity and relations between men under certain conditions became problematized. This presence, however, by no means signal a concretely formed continuity between sexual moralities of antiquity and Christianity. Christian pastoral developed alongside the latter during the Middle Ages organized Christian morality into a 'coherent', 'authoritarian' moral system, which became universal and compulsory to everyone. Although these themes were partially present in the sexual morality of antiquity, they were not invested with the same values or mechanisms of power that regulated its conduct. Simply, these themes were present as a 'thematic complex' only to the extent that they were proposed, rather than imposed, within scattered religious or philosophical movements (pp. 20-24). Regardless of similarities between them, what clearly distinguishes the authoritarian Christian morality around the penitential system of thirteenth century from the morality of antiquity was the "instances of authority that enforce the code, that require it to be learned and observed, that penalize infractions" (p. 29).

Yet, Foucault indicates, this system of morality developed around the penitential system was also substantially different from the early-Christian morality due to its systematicity, a tremendous capacity to adjust and to embrace every possible behavioral area of one's life. Therefore, considering an allegedly fixed Christian morality as a strict continuity, or discontinuity, of morality of antiquity need to be revisited. What requires further attention here is how such principles of morality, forms of self-relationships and self-practices were constantly redefined, modified and diversified (pp. 29-31). This, in Foucault's own words, would be "a matter of seeing how subjectivation was defined and transformed, from Classical Greek thought up to the formulation of the Christian doctrine and pastoral ministry regarding the flesh" (p. 32). In classical Greek thought, the notion of 'aphrodisia' had emerged to define acts, gestures and contacts producing a precise form of pleasure within a field of mysterious and ambiguous forces. Regardless of its similarities with concupiscence, there was a clear lack of concrete conceptual elaboration about this, or any theoretical reflection. Simply, those who coined the term aphrodisia were not concerned with "discovering the insidious presence of a power of undetermined limits and multiple masks beneath what appeared inoffensive or innocent" (p. 38).

One could identify a continuous struggle against one's desires in *Phaedrus*, but the references in Socrates' recommendations by no means reflect the explicit characteristics of a 'director of conscience'. Concerns with identifying implicit traces of desires, precautions to prevent desire from penetrating the soul and regulation of union and sexual conduct are genuine characteristics of Christian spirituality. In Greek thought, the acts of aphrodisia, desire and pleasure formed a concrete unity. Simply, dismantling this unity laid the foundations of 'ethics of the flesh', which later served as basis for the domain of 'sexuality'. This dismantling took place through both the opposition towards seeking sensual pleasure as the ultimate goal of sexual conduct, which signaled a 'moral devaluation' of pleasure; and problematization of desire, which served as basis for all further problematizations of human nature (pp. 40-42). In addition to this, Foucault argues, the principles of morality developed during the antiquity for free men in terms of various 'arts of using pleasures' were brought together through a 'theoretical ensemble' primarily by Augustine and other early-Christian theologians, which structured an interplay between 'death and immortality', marriage, austerity, 'conditions of access to truth', 'purification' and struggling 'concupiscence'. It was through this gradual transformation of 'moral experience' the central element in the problematization of sexual practices was "no longer pleasure and the aesthetics of its use, but desire and its hermeneutics" (pp. 252-254).

Evidently, in the light of how subjectivation was defined and transformed from antiquity to early-Christianity, one could highlight both a continuous relationship and a major departure between them. Considering the role of desire and its hermeneutics in the morality developed around penitential system during the Middle Ages, and the lack of strict codification and juridification in early-Christianity, perhaps a similar continuity, as well as discontinuity, can be placed between these two. What gives Christian pastoral a fundamental role in the problematization of antisemitism and sexuality is not a sudden problematizations of these. It is rather a gradual shift of focus from disapproval to problematizing an aspect of inner nature, which gradually transformed into the domain of abnormality. Therefore, drawing attention to the Christian pastoral highlights a new subjectivation gradually developed through penitential system that placed one under constant surveillance and moral examination. As it will be seen in the next section, the Augustinian conceptions of desire and its hermeneutics becomes very characteristic within spiritual direction.

From Penitence to the Pastoral: The Emergence of Sexuality as a Mode of Social Control

Problem of sexuality, according to Foucault, had emerged as a mode of social control from the penitential system through the practices of obligatory confession and spiritual direction. The new subjectivity developed around the problem of sexuality, in a way, served as basis for the 'juridico-medical' phenomenon of 'political monster' in the eighteenth century. In the mid-nineteenth century this monster, with its problem of 'instinct', transformed into the domain of 'abnormal' under psychiatry. The problem of sexuality, Foucault argues, laid the foundations of both these domains, and led to their subdivision to extend their grip on human existence at every possible level (Foucault, 2003, pp. 167-169). To draw a conceptual link between Arendt and Foucault, the relationship between problem of sexuality and political monster, and how this relates to antisemitism in Foucauldian theory requires further attention. In the light of this, this section will first explore how the problem of sexuality transformed from a problem of breaching laws of union into a problem of one's inner being -or thoughts and desires that formed the anatomy of the flesh. Second, it will focus on how this problem of inner being transformed into the problem of instinct around the notion of political monster.

First, Foucault stresses that in early-Christianity, penance was a voluntary practice that individuals could deliberately assume once in their lives if they committed a 'disgraceful sin', which involved being expelled from the church, rigorous fasts and suspending all sexual relations. By the thirteenth century, the ritual of confession had emerged from this ritual of penance. Yet, confession was characterized by the principle that one must regularly confess to a particular priest not only the serious sins, but all sins. From the thirteenth century onwards, tremendous extension of confession was corresponding to a great increase in the priests' power, and it went through a remarkable transformation between the Middle Ages and seventeenth century. Within obligatory confession, a system of questioning developed allowing the priest to control and structure the entire ritual by becoming able to remit sins. The increase in power was also corresponding to an increase in priest's knowledge, through which he was required to "question and impose the framework of his learning, his experience, and his moral and theological knowledge" (Foucault, 2003, pp. 174-176). By the sixteenth century, a period defined by Foucault as a 'phase of in-depth Christianization' in which Reformation and Council of Trent took place, the modern state began to form while the Church consolidated its 'grip on individual existence'. It was in this period that the Council of Trent transformed confession into an 'immense apparatus of analysis and control'. This apparatus simply made the entire life of an individual obliged to 'pass through the filter of confession'. The 'Christian pastoral', according to Foucault, referred to this apparatus -or in other words, the set of

techniques employed by the priest for the 'government of the souls'. It developed in a period that the existing state institutions were dramatically searching for new ways to exercise power over the bodies of its subjects (p. 177).

By the late-sixteenth century, the 'practice of spiritual direction' developed within seminaries and colleges as a major element of the pastoral alongside the confession. Through this spiritual direction, according to Foucault, concerns with sexuality, 'one's inner being', temptations and disciplinary measures became more deeply problematized. It simply formed a "double discursive filter through which one must pass all behavior, conduct, and relationships with others, as well as every thought, pleasure and passion" (pp. 183-184). Moreover, the problematized inner being introduced by spiritual direction replaced the former primary concern of confession, the 'laws of legitimate union', with thoughts and desires of penitent's body. This new form of examination, according to Foucault, was "a meticulous passage through the body, a sort of anatomy of the pleasures of the flesh" (p. 186). The body itself transformed through this examination into an analytic domain where the 'infinite sins of concupiscence' took place. Thus, the 'sin of lust' situated in this framework no longer as illegitimate forms of relationship, but in a much broader sense beginning with 'one's contact with oneself' (pp. 186-188). This placement of the body at the center of examination constitutes to a new domain of problematization which Foucault defines as the 'moral physiology of the flesh' (p.189).

Moreover, Foucault emphasizes that, this examination and control apparatus developed within the educational institutions of clergy served as a model for such institutions of secondary education as Jesuit colleges, where this model was further developed and expanded. Consequently, most political elites during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had substantial knowledge about these examination methods and concepts coined by the Church, which started to penetrate numerous areas of social and political life. Nonetheless, these methods of examination were developed in seminaries, where masturbation became the only form of sexuality to be controlled on regular basis. This made the 'solitary desiring body' more problematized than ever, and substantially reduced the attention to all other forms of illegitimate relationship. Yet, it was through the elites the notion of moral physiology of the flesh transformed into the 'political anatomy of the body' under the modern state, characterized by the transformation of body at the level of 'desire' and 'decency' (pp. 191-193). Moreover, Foucault further indicates that, the excessive problematization of sexuality and solitary desiring body under spiritual direction led to the crystallization of a 'meticulous analytical space' within seminaries. Divided into

separate rooms instead of dormitories, these seminaries were structured in a precise way that it allowed spiritual directors to observe and control sexual activities when and where it took place. When this analytical space became quintessential for the new disciplinary apparatuses of modern state, Foucault argues, the 'somewhat unreal theology of the flesh' transformed into constant examination of sexuality in its 'periodic and real unfolding' (pp. 226-227).

Moreover, Foucault emphasizes that penal institutions of the early-eighteenth century were the first institutions of state, where the set of 'procedures' and 'analyses' was borrowed from seminaries. Within these institutions, the judge became entrusted with the duty of 'penetrating the criminal's soul', and the question of 'criminal's nature' arise. Following the penal institutions, this set of procedures and analyses was borrowed by the new institutions of modern state, where it was further 'developed' and 'perfected'. This allowed the modern state to exercise its power uninterruptedly through its 'permanent mechanisms of surveillance and control'. Simply, similar to how spiritual directors operated within seminaries, the ruling elites of the new state became able to penetrate the 'social body' in its totality through these mechanisms (pp. 85-87). Yet, it was not only the set of procedures and analyses were borrowed, according to Foucault, but the problematization of inner nature as well. Within penal institutions, the moral physiology of the flesh transformed and reformulated into the political anatomy of the criminal -or the 'pathological nature of criminality'. Thus, the concepts and notions reformulated within these penal institutions took a new form when they entered the political discourses of both sides during the French Revolution (pp. 89-91). Around thirty years before the Revolution, concepts borrowed from the penal institutions started to define the nature of 'tyrant' -or in other words, the 'nature of despotic monarch'. By the Revolution's outbreak, the despotic monarch was frequently articulated as the 'greatest criminal', who breached the 'social pact' in its totality. This shift, according to Foucault, signaled Louis XVI as the first 'great juridical monster', and all political and moral monsters emerged during the early modern period were 'descendants' of him (pp. 93-95). Perhaps, in the light of Foucault's account on antisemitism discussed earlier, the following could be considered as its further elaboration;

> "The problems that arise in the discussions of the manner in which Louis XVI should be sentenced will be transposed in the second half of the nineteenth century to born criminals, to anarchists who also reject the social pact, to all monstrous criminals and all those nomadic figures who […] the social body does not recognize as belonging to it" (p. 96)

Moreover, the royalists simultaneously integrated the same discourses in their 'anti-Jacobin' counter-revolutionary literature, through which they accused revolutionaries for violating a social pact by revolting. These 'monster from above' and 'monster from below' gradually became a unified theme by the nineteenth century as a 'juridico-medical' figure, which laid the foundations of such disciplines as legal medicine, psychiatry, anthropology and ethnology as a 'grid of intelligibility'. Through this unification, an ethnological theory developed, which radically distanced Christian-European societies from the rest of the world -in other words, 'primitive societies' (pp. 98-103). Thus, what became 'valid' for ethnology swiftly became valid for psychoanalysis. Following their entrance to psychoanalysis, according to Foucault, concepts and the grid of intelligibility characterizing both the "despotic sovereign and people in revolt, now permeate the field of abnormality" (p. 104). As articulated above, the problematization of sexuality in Foucauldian theory, in a way, runs through every problematized group or figure in Europe between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. First, the moral physiology of the flesh developed within seminaries as a grid of intelligibility, which was grounded upon this problem, transformed under the penal institutions into the political anatomy of the criminal. By the nineteenth century, this political anatomy gave rise to two distinct monsters from below and above, which gradually unified and formed the great juridico-medical figure under various scientific institutions. Finally, the domain of abnormality had emerged from this unified juridico-medical figure and became a more sophisticated analytical grid than ever. It will be seen in the next section that, the discursive formations of these subjectivations remarkably correspond with Arendt's account on how the subjectivity was formed around 'being of Jewish origin' during the same period.

From 'Judaism' to 'Jewishness': How the Problem of Sexuality Runs Through the New Subjectivity Around 'Being of Jewish Origin':

> "Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape. A crime, moreover, is met with punishment; a vice can only be exterminated" (Arendt, 1973, p. 87)

In the light of above-mentioned statement of Arendt, conditions that gave rise to antisemitism as a problem of inner nature illustrates a radically new Jewish-Gentile relationship, which was not present in their religious-oriented persecution throughout the Middle Ages. In fact, she strongly emphasizes that only after their emancipation under the pretext of secularization, the Gentile society became concerned with developing a narrative to distinguish itself from the Jews. Starting from their gradual admission to the Gentile society in the eighteenth century, Arendt identifies several crucial turning points in terms of how the subjectivity around 'being of Jewish origin' transformed. First, their gradual admission to the society gave rise to the concerns with 'ordinary Jew' and 'emancipation of Jews from Judaism', which was initially a derivative of the Enlightenment concern with education. Second, beginning from the early nineteenth century in Prussia, Arendt argues, that the previously distinguished ordinary Jew and exceptional Jew formed a unified figure as a shared psychological trait. By the end of the century it became widely acknowledged as an abnormality 'acquired by birth', and finally gained political significance in the early-twentieth century when it merged with Pan-Germanism in Austria. Evidently, it can be argued that the forms of subjectivity identified by Arendt are, to an extent, corresponding to the forms of subjectivity identified by Foucault following the eighteenth-century development of political anatomy of the body. This section will aim to serve an overview of the discursive formation of antisemitism stressed by Arendt. In the light of this overview, a conceptual link between the forms of subjectivity identified by Foucault and Arendt will be constructed in relation to power mechanisms and institutions.

According to Arendt, between sixteenth and seventeenth centuries all absolute monarchs entrusted 'court Jews' to handle their financial affairs, who became the only individuals having 'inter-European connections' with stable international credit at their disposal. Thus, following the French Revolution, the nation-state was fully developed in a 'modern sense', which required an enormous amount of capital to sustain its expanded state machinery. This led the 'wealthier strata' of Central and Eastern Jewry to become prominent bankers by combining their wealth. By the eighteenth century, these wealthier strata

obtain certain privileges and settled in prominent urban and financial centers of Europe. This was shortly followed by legal emancipation for the entire Jewry in all developed nation-states (pp. 14-19).

Nonetheless, Arendt strongly emphasizes that, those who defended Jewish emancipation from eighteenth century onwards were paradoxically the first to elaborate a 'Jewish question'. This question, under the pretext of 'education', was simply formulated through the concepts borrowed from the Enlightenment, which originally applied to both Jews and Gentiles. These Gentile intellectuals initially considered that a 'cultured' and 'educated' strata would form a 'vanguard in both camps'. This demand, according Arendt, gradually became a 'one-sided affair', by which only the Jews were expected to be educated and cultured enough to distinguish themselves from the poor and uneducated Jewish masses. Johann Gottfried Herder, for instance, an eighteenth-century philosopher and theologian substantially elaborated on Jewry, in which he "proposed education as the true road to emancipation of Jews from Judaism, from the old and proud prejudices" (p. 58). Yet, within these mostly ethnological articulations they were portrayed as more alien and exotic than previously understood. This had also dramatic effects on the level of subjectivity among educated Jewry; they were demanded to become 'exceptions to their own people' and recognize the sharp distances beginning to emerge between them and Gentiles (pp. 57-58).

Up to this point, from a Foucauldian perspective, the 'poor and uneducated Jewish mass' could be identified as becoming a subject of political anatomy of the body, in which 'Judaism' was problematized as a set of doctrinal-based prejudices. Through this problematization, these Jewish masses became subjectivized as the first great monster among Jewry. Thus, from a Foucauldian view, the problem of emancipation of Jews from Judaism could only arise from political anatomy of the Jew when its grid of intelligibility is borrowed from spiritual direction. As seen in Foucauldian political anatomy of the body, there is an explicit motivation in Arendt's account to transform the ordinary Jew's body at the level of desire and decency. Jewishness as a hereditary condition or a problem of one's inner being is not yet present as such, in Foucauldian terms, would require a more sophisticated grid of intelligibility to emerge under such disciplines as modern medicine, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. It will be seen in Arendt's following line of argumentation that how swiftly the problematization of inner nature penetrates these elaborations as observed by Foucault.

According to Arendt, 1812 was a turning point for the social history of European Jewry when they gained full civic rights. Yet two years before, Prussia lost its Polish provinces along with most of its poor Jewish masses after its defeat by Napoleon. Simply, following this defeat, there were no longer any poor Jewish masses remained in Prussia to contrast with the rich or intellectual strata of Jewry (pp. 58-61). Consequently, conservative aristocrats and intellectuals who previously stressed their contempt for the poor Jewish masses of Poland rapidly became concerned with the whole Jewry, which laid the foundations of political antisemitism. A shared behavioral-pattern gradually developed among German Jewry as they tried to conform to a society which discriminated against every Jew of 'ordinary kind'. Their quest to constantly distinguish themselves from the rest of Jewry, paradoxically developed as a shared behavioral pattern, gradually giving rise to a conception of 'Jewishness' based on a particular psychological quality. This, in particular, transformed the 'Jewish question into a 'problem of every Jew' (pp. 65-68). In other words, the notion of 'belonging to the Jewish people', which previously referred to a religion and nationality, gradually transformed into a fact of birth among assimilated Jewry (p. 73).

Similar to Foucauldian terms, one could here identify a formation of ordinary Jew as the monster from below, and assimilated Jew as the monster from above. Both these figures are defined through a particular behavioral pattern and gradually form a unity. Thus, the concept of 'Jewishness' begins to define a whole psychological trait, and gradually transforms into a 'fact of birth'. One could also see this unification in parallel with Foucault's account on how both juridico-medical figures form a unity as a new grid of intelligibility under the disciplines of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Here, previously ethnological elaborations of both figures transform into a fixed psychological trait, which became applicable to everyone of Jewish origin regardless of faith or national loyalty. Nonetheless, in contrast with Foucauldian account, it deserves to be mentioned that the monster from above in Arendt's account arise from the monster from below. Yet, this can be neglected as a mere chronological difference as does not make a major theoretical or conceptual inconsistency.

Moreover, the climax of nineteenth-century antisemitism, according to Arendt, took place in France, where along with homosexuality, Jewishness as a psychological trait became two of the 'most fashionable' vices. This would only gain political significance when it was borrowed from France and reformulated in Austria and Germany to become known as Pan-Germanism that served as a model for Nazism, under which both to become exterminated (pp. 73-80). Nonetheless, "in both cases", Arendt argues, "society was far from being prompted by a revision of prejudices. They did not doubt that

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homosexuals were 'criminals' or that Jews were 'traitors'; they only revised their attitude towards crime and treason" (p. 81). Its departure from religious and political aspects transformed Jewish origin into Jewishness as a mere psychological quality. Thus, it gradually developed a new pattern among homosexuals and assimilated Jewry to embrace their differences from what was commonly defined as the 'normal', and to believe these differences were 'acquired by birth' (pp. 83-84).

Evidently, this can be regarded as the only case that sexuality intersects with antisemitism in Arendt's account under the domain of abnormality. In parallel with Foucauldian account, following their introduction to psychiatry and psychoanalysis, Arendt highlights how these two were placed under the grip of abnormality, through which they were no longer mere 'fashionable vices'. Here, another shared element in both views also becomes clear. Arendt indicates that instead of a 'revision of prejudices' -in other words, a considerable change in morality- the society went through a revision of what has been understood as crime and treason. In Foucauldian terms, this could be explained as what has been previously understood as crime and treason through ethnological and juridical elaborations transforms into the domain of abnormality following the development of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. Simply, this shift is not understood by Foucault as a development of a new morality, but as the development of an immense apparatus of analysis and control under various scientific disciplines. Nonetheless, as the initial problematization that gave rise to such immense apparatus of analysis and control, the problem of sexuality runs through antisemitism since the early problematization of the poor Jewish masses. This signaled the first time that political anatomy of the body was put to work to bring Jewry under its grid of intelligibility in terms of desire and decency. These, along with the previously discussed conceptual links, will be revisited in the conclusion to construct a coherent whole.

Concluding Words:

So far, this paper has first discussed that the problem of sexuality in Foucauldian terms, which emerges during early-Christianity through the reformulation of concepts borrowed from antiquity. Second, this problem gradually gives rise to an immense apparatus of examination and control beginning from the Middle Ages under the ritual of confession. Third, through the emergence of spiritual direction in seminaries, the problem of sexuality develops into problem of one's inner being, which gives rise to the moral anatomy of the flesh as a grid of intelligibility. Then, starting from the penal institutions and revolutionary discourses in the eighteenth century, the moral anatomy of the flesh gives rise to political anatomy of the body. This political anatomy also borrows and reformulates the problem of inner nature, which runs through every problematization of inner being from the late-sixteenth century onwards and gains its final form as the domain of abnormality when it was 'opened up' to psychiatry. Foucault simply articulates this in his own words that "the problem of sexuality [...] is immediately applied to the general field of abnormality as an analytic grid by which the field is codified and subdivided (Foucault, 2003, pp. 167-168). What requires exclusive attention here is that, according to Foucault, the domain of abnormality borrows and reformulates an analytic grid from where the problem of sexuality had emerged. This is precisely how Foucault places the problem of sexuality at the core of all problematizations of inner nature between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. In the last section, an overview of Arendt's account on antisemitism has been served in relation to Foucault's account on different forms of subjectivity developed around the problematization of inner nature from eighteenth century onwards. First it has been argued that the political anatomy of the body borrowed from seminaries as a grid of intelligibility gives rise to the poor Jewish masses as the first juridico-medical monster associated with the Jewry. This, gradually transformed into two figures, the Jew in general and exceptional Jew, which unified into a fixed psychological trait as 'Jewishness'.

Following the development of such disciplines as psychiatry, the notion of Jewishness quickly enters the domain of abnormality, under which it becomes acknowledged as a fact of birth. The grid of intelligibility that transformed being of Jewish origin under the domain of abnormality was initially borrowed from spiritual direction, which also borrowed its immense problematization of inner being. It also deserves to be taken into account that, moral autonomy of the flesh transformed into political anatomy of the body through penal institutions and revolutionary discourses around the same time that the Jewry started to enter Gentile societies. Consequently, the inner nature of a Jew, from a juridico-medical monster to abnormal, becomes intelligible to the Gentile society by bringing the Jewish community under constant surveillance; in a way, similar to what had been practiced in seminaries in order to control sexual

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behavior. After all, elaborations of the stylization of masculine conduct during antiquity were borrowed and reformulated during early-Christianity which gave rise to the initial problem of sexuality. That is precisely why both the problem of sexuality and antisemitism cannot be induced to a fixed codification of morality that emerged either during the early-Christianity or late-Christianity. They can be rather defined as intertwined outcomes of constant borrowing from preceding discourses and their reformulation; through which they constantly form new forms of subjectivity under the power mechanisms of numerous scientific and disciplinary institutions.

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